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ABSTRACT: This paper offers a concise explanation of each of the ten most relevant legal and 
procedural issues, in their political context and in chronological order, that have arisen in the United 
Kingdom since the British voted to activate the EU’s new and hitherto unused Article 50 TEU 
withdrawal clause.
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EL CAMINO HACIA EL BREXIT: DIEZ PROCEDIMIENTOS BIRTÁNICOS PARA 
ABANDONAR LA UNIÓN EUROPEA
RESUMEN: En este trabajo se ofrece una explicación concisa de cada una de las diez cuestiones 
jurídicas y procedimentales más importantes, en su contexto político y en orden cronológico, que 
han surgido en el Reino Unido desde que los británicos votaron activar la nueva y hasta ahora no 
utilizada cláusula de retirada del artículo 50 del Tratado de la Unión Europea.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Brexit; retirada de la Unión Europea; Artículo 50 TUE; Reino Unido; 
negociaciones.
1 PhD candidate, University of  Salamanca.
Citation: POLAK, P. R, «The Road to Brexit: Ten UK Procedures towards Leaving the EU», Cuadernos de 
Gibraltar–Gibraltar Reports, num. 3, 2018-2019.
Received: 24 December 2019.
Accepted: 28 March 2020.
CGIB03-polak.indd   1 05/05/2020   14:49:33
2Cuadernos de Gibraltar – Gibraltar Reports
Número 3/Issue # 3, 2018-2019, 1303
ISSN 2444-7382
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Cuad_Gibraltar.2019.i3.1303
The Road to Brexit: Ten UK Procedures towards Leaving the EU
I. THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW AND THE MILLER CASE
As everyone knows, on 23 June 2016 a referendum was held in the Uni-
ted Kingdom (UK) on whether this Member State should remain in or leave 
the European Union (EU). A majority of  51.9% of  those voting on a 72% 
turn out voted to leave. Legally, the result was not binding as the European 
Union Referendum Act 20122 provided no detail on the consequences of  the 
referendum result,3 but the Government pledged to honour the result and it 
has since been treated as politically and democratically binding. Immediately 
after the referendum, Mr David Cameron resigned as Prime Minister (PM) 
as he had campaigned to remain on the new terms for UK membership he 
had negotiated with Brussels.4 Mrs Theresa May, who had been Home Secre-
tary, was chosen as leader of  the Conservative party and took his place. Her 
first public utterance on becoming Prime Minister was “Brexit means Brexit” 
which, widely criticised as a meaningless tautology, was in fact a very serious 
indication that the UK was on the verge of  the unprecedented invocation of  
Article 50 of  the Treaty on European Union (TEU).5
The machinery for leaving the European Union is contained in Article 50 
TEU. Its first paragraph is clear that, if  a Member State decides to trigger its 
withdrawal from the Union, the conditions are a matter for that Member Sta-
tes’ law in accord with its “own constitutional requirements”.6 Once a Mem-
ber State has decided to withdraw, it must notify the European Council of  
its intention. What is not so clear in the case of  the United Kingdom is what 
those constitutional requirements to decide to leave the Union and notify that 
2 UK European Union Referendum Act 2015 c.36. 
3 Chalmers, D., “Gina Miller and the last Gasp of  Parliamentary Sovereignty?”, Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 24, no. 1 (2017), p. 4. 
4 Conclusions of  the European Council of  18-19 February 2016, A New Settlement for the 
United Kingdom within the European Union, EUCO 1/16.
5 A concise look at the back story of  the 2016 referendum can be found in WallaCe, H., 
“Heading for the Exit: the United Kingdom’s Troubled Relationship with the European 
Union”, Journal of  Contemporary European Research, vol. 12, no. 4 (2016), pp. 809-815; whilst a 
running commentary on UK progress towards Brexit is offered in the Editorials of  European 
Public Law, vol. 22, no. 3 (2016) to vol. 24, no. 4 (2018). Finally, for an interesting analysis on 
the suitability of  using a referendum to resolve the “British question” read Gosalbo bono, R., 
“Brexit o Bremain”, Revista General de Derecho Europeo, vol. 39 (2016), pp. 1-23.
6 CraiG, P., “Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts”, European Law Review, vol. 41, no. 4 (2016), p. 29. 
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intention are. This is due to the peculiar constitutional arrangements of  this 
country which, unlike most others, “does not have a constitution in the sense 
of  a single coherent code of  fundamental law which prevails over all other 
sources of  law” but, instead, has an unwritten constitution composed of  “a 
combination of  statutes, events, conventions, academic writings and judicial 
decisions.”7 In virtually all other Member States there are written constitutio-
nal norms for treaty termination and generally they also provide for specific 
rules for the special case of  withdrawal from the EU.8 If, for example, it were 
Spain wishing to withdraw from the European Union, its own constitutional 
requirements are neatly set out in its Law of  Treaties and other International 
Agreements.9 Article 37(3) of  said norm makes a remission to the Spanish 
Constitution and together they require previous authorization of  the Spanish 
Parliament before the Council of  Ministers can terminate certain treaties, 
among which we can find those that confer on an international organisation 
the exercise of  powers derived from the Constitution,10 i.e. the EU Trea-
ties.11 In Britain, on the other hand, the lack of  any specific constitutional 
statute relating to its withdrawal from the European Union became a very 
serious (and highly mediatised) issue after the referendum. So much so that 
7 Judgment of  24 January 2017, R (on the application of  Miller and other) v Secretary of  State for 
Exiting the European Union, UKSC 5, paragraph 40. 
8 Examples of  national constitutions that refer specifically to the case of  withdrawal from the 
European Union are, among others: Articles 23 of  the German Grundgesetz, Articles 88-1 
to 88-7 of  the Constitution française, and Article 117 of  the Costituzione della Repubblica 
Italiana.
9 Ley 25/2014 de Tratados y otros Acuerdos Internacionales.
10 Article 37(3) Ley 25/2004: “No obstante, lo dispuesto en los apartados anteriores, los 
tratados internacionales comprendidos en los artículos 93 y 94.1 de la Constitución Española 
solo podrán ser denunciados previa autorización de las Cortes Generales, de conformidad 
con lo dispuesto en el artículo 96.2 de la Constitución Española.” And it is Article 93 of  the 
Constitution that refers to the EU Treaties: “Mediante ley orgánica se podrá autorizar la cel-
ebración de tratados por los que se atribuya a una organización o institución internacional el 
ejercicio de competencias derivadas de la Constitución. Corresponde a las Cortes Generales 
o al Gobierno, según los casos, la garantía del cumplimiento de estos tratados y de las resolu-
ciones emanadas de los organismos internacionales o supranacionales titulares de la cesión.”
11 For more on the termination of  Treaties in the case of  Spain, see: González VeGa, J. 
“Artículo 37. Denuncia y suspension”, in Andrés Sáenz de Santa María, P., Diez-Hochleitner, 
J. & Pérez de Nanclares, J. (eds), Comentarios a la Ley de Tratados y otros Acuerdos Internationales, 
Thomson Reuters (2015), pp. 763-788. 
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it resulted in an extraordinary academic debate12 and in the most important 
judgment of  the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) since its creation in 200913 and 
maybe even the most important British judgment since the XVII Century:14 
The Miller case.15
This case arose because the new Prime Minister had announced her in-
tention to give notice under Article 50 TEU before the end of  March 2017 
and, more importantly, had argued that it was the executive’s power (known 
as the “royal prerogative”) to do so without the need for Parliamentary au-
thorisation.16 Business owner Gina Miller and others judicially challenged this 
12 The first academic debate on the royal prerogative, the role of  Parliament and the trigge-
ring of  Article 50 in the Brexit context can be found in barber, N., hiCkman, T. & kinG, J., 
“Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s indispensable role”, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 
June 2016, written on the Monday following the referendum. See also: DouGlas-sCott, S., 
“Brexit, Article 50 and the Contested British Constitution”, The Modern Law Review, vol. 79, 
no. 6 (2016), pp. 1019-1040 and the doctrine there cited. 
13 In 2005 Parliament passed the Constitutional Reform Act which, for the first time in British his-
tory, provided for the separation of  the Appellate Committee (Supreme Court) from the legislature 
(Parliament) and the executive (Government). The last hearings and judgments in the House of  
Lords took place on 30 July and the new Supreme Court opened on 1 October 2009. The Miller 
case was the first ever to be heard en banc by the full court (eleven justices, there being one vacancy). 
14 bell, J., “La Cour supreme du Royaume-Uni et le Brexit”, Revue française de droit administra-
tive (2017), p. 220. 
15 Judgment of  24 January 2017, R (on the application of  Miller and another) v Secretary of  State 
for Exiting the European Union, UKSC 5. In this sense, Eeckhout remarks “The litigation was 
conducted under conditions of  unprecedented public attention, ranging far beyond the tra-
ditional echo chambers of  lawyers and legal academics. For months the mainstream media 
focused on Gina Miller – now a celebrity – and her daring challenge to the government’s 
plans. Concepts such as ‘the royal prerogative’ and the ‘Sewel Convention’, and cases like De 
Keyser Royal Hotel, normally the preserve of  sophisticated constitutional lawyers, became 
items of  popular debate. In academia there was a veritable blogfest on what the litigation 
was about, and how it should be resolved. This was the case of  the century, and possibly of  
the last one too. The hearings before the Supreme Court were live-streamed in an unprece-
dented reality show, populated by star-studded barristers and a fearsomely erudite panel of  
Justices.” (eeCkhout, P., “The Emperor has no clothes. Brexit and the UK constitution”, in 
Martill, B. & Staiger, U. (eds), Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of  Europe, UCL Press 
(2018), p. 165). 
16 “Theresa May will trigger Brexit negotiations without Commons vote”, 27 August 2016, 
recovered from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/26/theresa-may-will-trigger-
brexit-negotiations-without-commons-vot/>.
CGIB03-polak.indd   4 05/05/2020   14:49:33
5Cuadernos de Gibraltar – Gibraltar Reports
Número 3/Issue # 3, 2018-2019, 1303
ISSN 2444-7382
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Cuad_Gibraltar.2019.i3.1303
Polly Ruth Polak
power of  the executive to trigger the UK’s withdrawal process without the 
authority of  an Act of  Parliament. The two main arguments were the fo-
llowing: The Government relied on the principle that, as a matter of  law, the 
conduct of  the UK’s foreign relations falls within the prerogative power of  
the Crown, advised by its Ministers, and this included the power to negotiate, 
amend and withdraw from international treaties. What is more, there was 
no need to make any exception regarding the EU Treaties. The claimants, 
however, argued that although the Crown can undoubtedly enter into and wi-
thdraw from treaties through the exercise of  prerogative powers of  its Minis-
ters, it cannot, by doing so, alter domestic law. Given that a notification under 
Article 50 would result in the Treaties ceasing to have effect in domestic law, 
it would in fact alter this law and destroy statutory rights, and this could not 
lawfully be done without a new Act of  Parliament. The UK Supreme Court 
agreed with the latter approach and recognised that the unusual nature of  the 
EU Treaties due to the fact that EU law was an independent and overriding 
source of  domestic law made irreconcilable that such a fundamental legal 
change as withdrawal from those Treaties be carried out by Ministers without 
authorisation of  Parliament.17 Indeed, the decision to leave the EU was so 
far-reaching that it simply could not be left to the executive.18
Parliament then responded by passing the European Union (Notification of  
Withdrawal) Act 2017 which received royal assent on 16th March 2017 and 
authorised the Prime Minister to give the notification.19 Theresa May did so 
by sending a letter to the President of  the European Council, Donald Tusk, 
on 29th March 201720, turning the 29th March 2019 into the official Brexit 
day by effect of  Article 50 paragraph 3: “The Treaties shall cease to apply 
to the State in question from the date of  entry into force of  the withdrawal 
agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification […]” (emphasis added). 
17 Judgment of  24 January 2017, R (on the application of  Miller and other), paragraphs 65-101. 
18 eeCkhout, P., op. cit., p. 168. For a detailed explanation of  the case and the decision of  the 
court see: maCkie, S., “Brexit and the Trouble with an Uncodified Constitution: R (Miller) 
V. Secretary of  State for Exiting the European Union”, Vermont Law Review, vol. 42 (2017), 
pp. 297-343.
19 European Union (Notification of  Withdrawal) Act 2017 ch.9.
20 UK Prime Minister’s letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50, 29 March 2017. 
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II. THE EUROPEAN UNION (WITHDRAWAL) ACT 2018
Swayed by recent polls that placed the Conservatives 21 points ahead 
of  Labour and hoping that a decisive election victory would strengthen the 
government’s hand in the Brexit negotiations, the PM managed to have Par-
liament dissolved and call a snap general election which was held on 8 June 
2017. The result was that May’s Government in fact lost its overall majority 
in the House of  Commons and was only able to form a new government 
through a “confidence and supply” agreement with the Democratic Unionist 
Party of  Northern Ireland (DUP). At this time, negotiations for a UK Wi-
thdrawal Agreement (WA) were proceeding with the European Commission 
and the new Parliament took the legislative steps needed to prepare UK law 
for leaving the Union. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 received 
Royal Assent on 26 June 2018. It defined the initial “exit day” as 29 March 
2019 and stipulated that, from that day, the European Communities Act 
1972 which had provided for the UK’s entry into what became the European 
Union would be repealed, although much of  the existing EU law would be 
preserved as the law of  the United Kingdom, with provision for exceptions 
and modifications to be made by delegated legislation (the so-called Henry 
VIII powers).21 The Act also established that Parliamentary approval was re-
quired of  any Withdrawal Agreement reached by the Government and, if  
no agreement was reached or did not obtain approval by the legislative, the 
Government would have to state how it proposed to proceed and also bring 
that proposal before the Houses of  Parliament.22 On 14 November 2018 the 
negotiations between the UK and the EU concluded with a Draft Withdrawal 
21 “What is the EU Withdrawal Act 2018?”, Institute for Government, recovered from <https://www.
instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/eu-withdrawal-act> (last accessed 18 November 2019).
22 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 c.16. In summary, it provided that a Withdrawal 
Agreement may only be ratified if  (a) a Minister of  the Crown has laid before Parliament 
a statement that political agreement has been reached, a copy of  the negotiated withdrawal 
agreement and a copy of  the framework for the future relationship; (b) the House of  Com-
mons has approved the withdrawal agreement and future framework; (c) the House of  Lords 
has, in effect, taken note of  them both; and (d) an Act of  Parliament has been passed which 
contains provision for the implementation of  the withdrawal agreement.
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Agreement setting out terms for a an orderly exit from the European Union23 
and a non-binding Political Declaration (PD) establishing a framework for 
the future EU-UK relationship to be negotiated by the end of  2020.24 The 
first thus laid out the terms of  the divorce in order to secure an orderly with-
drawal, essentially dealing with three key substantive issues: citizens’ rights, a 
financial settlement and a solution to avoiding a border between Ireland and 
Northern Ireland.25 The PD, on the other hand, was a non-binding docu-
ment taking account of  the framework for a future relationship between the 
ex-Member State and the Union to be fleshed out during trade negotiations 
once the latter’s withdrawal became effective, i.e. once the WA entered into 
force. Given the new legal requirements of  Parliamentary approval of  the 
WA for its ratification as an international treaty, several members of  the UK, 
EU and Scottish parliaments had sought a ruling from the European Court 
of  Justice on the possibility of  a departing country to unilaterally revoke its 
Article 50 notification, a matter on which said provision was silent. In other 
words, they wanted to know whether there was a legally valid third option for 
MPs voting on the Withdrawal Agreement between approving it or causing 
the UK to leave without a deal by legal default of  Article 50(3) —that of  
revoking the notification and stopping the Article 50 process with the UK 
remaining in the European Union—.
23 European Commission Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of  the United Kingdom of  
Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic 
Energy Community, as agreed at negotiators’ level, 14 November 2018, TF50 (2018) 55. 
24 European Commission Political declaration setting out the framework for the future re-
lationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom, 22 November 2018, XT 
21095/18.
25 It also included other separation provisions concerning ongoing procedures, goods on the mar-
ket, etc as well as set up a transition period needed to avoid a gap in the legal relations between the 
EU and the UK once the latter became a third country with the entry into force of  its WA but had 
not yet finalised agreement on its future relationship with the Union. Until December 2020, unless 
extended by the parties, most EU law would continue to apply to and in the UK.
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III. THE REVOCATION OF THE NOTIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL: WIGHTMAN
Although the claimants were initially unsuccessful,26 on 21 September 
2018, the Court of  Session, Inner House, First Division (Scotland, United 
Kingdom), granted the request for a preliminary ruling to the European 
Court of  Justice.27 The European Court received the request on 3 October 
2018 and agreed to the expedited procedure in light of  the urgency of  the 
case, since Brexit was due on 29 March 2019 and the vote on the Withdrawal 
Agreement would have to occur well in advance. Spanish Advocate General 
(AG) Manuel Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered his Opinion on 4 Decem-
ber 2018, and the Full Court gave its ruling on the 10 December 201828 in 
the now landmark case Wightman.29 The latter followed the former’s reaso-
ning and decided that Article 50 TEU must be interpreted as meaning that, 
where a Member State has notified the European Council of  its intention to 
withdraw from the European Union, that Member State —for as long as a 
withdrawal agreement has not entered into force or, if  no such agreement 
has been concluded, for as long as the two-year period laid down in Article 
50(3) TEU, possibly extended in accordance with that paragraph, had not 
expired— may revoke that notification unilaterally with the purpose of  con-
firming its EU membership and bringing the withdrawal procedure to an end. 
One of  the main arguments was that a Member State could not be forced to 
withdraw from the European Union against its will, which could have been 
the inevitable result if  it was not allowed to unilaterally reverse its decision to 
withdraw and stop the Article 50 process.30
26 For more on the initial refusals and appeals of  the petition see: taylor, R. & Wilson, A., 
“Brexit, the Revocation of  Article 50, and the Path not Taken: Wightman and Others for 
Judicial Review against the Secretary of  State for Exiting the European Union”, Edinburgh 
Law Review, vol. 22, no. 3 (2018), pp. 417-422; armstronG, K., “The Right To Revoke an EU 
Withdrawal Notification: Putting the Bullet Back in the Article 50 Chamber?”, The Cambridge 
Law Journal, vol. 78, no. 1 (2019), pp. 24-38. 
27 Reclaiming Motion of  21 September 2018 by Andy Wightman and Others against Secre-
tary Of  State For Exiting The European Union, ScotCS CSIH_62.
28 Advocate General Manuel Campos Opinion of  4 December 2018 to the Wightman case, 
EU:C:2018:978.
29 Judgment of  10 December 2018, Wightman, C-621/18, EU:C:2018:999.
30 For a longer analysis of  the Wightman case see: GeorGopoulos, A. “Revoking Article 50 
TEU (C-621/18 Wightman and others): ‘Iphigenia Must Reach the Altar’”, UK Constitutional 
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IV. THE UK-EU DRAFT WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT
Theresa May’s 2018 Withdrawal Agreement was first rejected by the Hou-
se of  Commons on the 15 January 2019 by 432 to 202 votes. With an opposi-
tion majority of  230 votes, it was the largest defeat on a government motion 
in the era of  universal suffrage. Apart from “remainer” MPs voting against 
the deal as the CJEU’s Wightman ruling had removed the threat of  crashing 
out without a deal, the main reason that drove May to this disastrous result 
was the (in)famous “Irish backstop”, an anathema to both hard-line “bre-
xiters” and the DUP on whose approval her Withdrawal Agreement really 
depended.31 The backstop included in the WA planned to keep the UK in 
a customs arrangement with the EU as long as no future deal on trade was 
reached with an alternative solution to avoiding a border on the Isle of  Ire-
land. This raised, to some leaver MPs, the unacceptable situation of  the UK 
being trapped inside the customs union indefinitely, with no legal right of  
withdrawal without EU consent. The DUP, on the other hand, were opposed 
to the backstop on the grounds that it would require Northern Ireland to be 
subject to closer regulatory alignment with the EU than the rest of  the UK.32 
After this first defeat, the Prime Minister then held a final round of  negotia-
tions with the EU and secured a package of  interpretations and clarifications 
on the Withdrawal Agreement and a sequence of  new votes took place. On 
12 March 2019 a second meaningful vote on the “new package” was held and 
May’s deal was again rejected in the House of  Commons by 391 to 242 vo-
tes.33 On 13 March, MPs voted to reject a “no deal” Brexit and, on 14 March, 
they approved 412 to 202 to seek to agree with the European Union an exten-
sion of  the negotiating period beyond the initial 29 March 2019 date with a 
view to finalising the ratification of  the Withdrawal Agreement which had so 
far failed in Parliament.34 On 21 March 2019, the European Council agreed 
Law Blog, December 2018. 
31 o’leary, Brendan “How Theresa May’s Brexit Deal Collapsed.The Return of  the Irish 
Question”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 98, no. 2 (2019).
32 GooDlaD, G., “The Slow-Motion Downfall of  Theresa May”, Political Insight, vol. 10, no. 3 (2019).
33 House of  Commons, The UK’s EU Withdrawal Agreement, Briefing Paper 08453, 11 April 2019.
34 House of  Commons, Extending Article 50: could Brexit be delayed?, Briefing Paper 8496, 21 
March 2019.
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to an extension until 22 May 2019, but only provided the Withdrawal Agree-
ment was approved by the House of  Commons in the following week.35
The weekend before the third and final vote on May’s Withdrawal Agree-
ment, it was estimated that a crowd of  over one million people marched 
through central London to demand that MPs grant them a fresh referendum 
on Brexit.36 However, a new people’s vote was not introduced in the Brexit 
policies of  any of  the main political parties. On 29 of  March 2019, the day 
Britain was due to leave, a third and final vote once again defeated the Prime 
Minister’s deal by 344 to 286 votes.37 This meant the UK had missed the EU 
deadline to delay Brexit to 22 May and leave with a deal. For such a case, the 
European Council had already agreed in the same Decision abovementioned 
to a longer extension.38 If  the UK was still to be a Member State on 23-26 
May 2019, it would be under the obligation to hold elections to the European 
Parliament (EP) in accordance with Union law. Therefore, it was expected the 
UK indicate a way forward before 12 April 2019 and, among other things, 
whether it would be holding such elections. On the 8th April and a few days 
before that deadline, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019 was passed.39 
This required a Minister of  the Crown to move a motion that the House of  
Commons agree to the Prime Minister seeking another extension. Pursuant 
to that Act, Prime Minister Theresa May sought a second extension, which 
on 10th April 2019 was granted until 31 October 2019.40 On the same day, the 
Government made the Order enabling the holding of  European Parliament 
elections still with the idea that if  the UK reached agreement to leave the EU 
35 European Council Decision taken in agreement with the United Kingdom, extending the 
period under Article 50(3)TEU, 22 March 2019, EUCO XT 20006/19.
36 “One million join march against Brexit as Tories plan to oust May”, 23 March 2019, re-
covered from <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/23/one-million-march-
against-brexit-tories-plan-oust-may> (last accessed 18 November 2019).
37 “Brexit: MPs reject May’s EU withdrawal agreement”, 30 March 2019, recovered from 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47752017> (last accessed 18 November 2019). 
38 Supra 35.
39 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019, c.16.
40 European Council Decision taken in agreement with the United Kingdom extending the 
period under Article 50(3)TEU, 11 April 2019, EUCO XT 20013/19. The regulation changing 
the “exit day” was made the next day by amending the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.
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before 23 May then the legislation allowing EP elections to happen would be 
repealed and UK participation would be cancelled.41
V. 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS
The UK initially triggered Article 50 TEU long before it was prepared 
for the immensity of  its deeply complex EU withdrawal negotiations.42 One 
key consideration for this premature decision was a desire to avoid participa-
tion in the European Parliament elections.43 Many also opined later that, for 
the same reason, the talks could not be extended beyond the initial two year 
period because it would create the bizarre situation of  those same citizens 
that had refused EU membership in the Brexit referendum now voting in 
EU elections.44 Nonetheless, on 7 May 2019 Theresa May’s government con-
ceded that there was not enough time left to get her Withdrawal Agreement 
through Parliament and therefore the UK would have to take part in the 
European plebiscite.45
Three years after Britain voted to leave the EU, the new 2019 EU Par-
liament would again be composed of  751 members, including 73 British 
MEPs.46 The European Parliament elections held in the UK on 23 May 2019 
had the second highest turn-out in any European election in this country at 
37%.47 As campaigning centred entirely on the issue of  withdrawal, votes 
41 House of  Commons, Brexit delayed again: until 31 October 2019?, Briefing Paper 8549, 17 
April 2019.
42 roGers, I., 9 Lessons in Brexit, Short Books (2019), pp. 32-44.
43 House of  Commons, European Parliament Elections 2019: results and analysis, Briefing Paper 
8600, 26 June 2019.
44 “EU has no choice but to approve Brexit extension”, 20 March 2019, recovered from 
<https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-has-no-choice-but-to-approve-brexit-extension/> 
(last accessed 18 November 2019).
45 “Brexit: UK will take part in European elections, says David Lidington”, 7 May 2019, 
recovered from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48188951> (last accessed 18 
November 2019).
46 On the 29 June 2018 the European Council adopted a decision reducing and redistribu-
ting European Parliament seats following the decision by the United Kingdom to exit the 
European Union to become effective once Brexit was final (European Council Decision 
establishing the composition of  the European Parliament, EUCO 7/1/18).
47 The first being the 2014 EP elections at 38% turn-out.
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shifted from the two main Conservative and Labour parties advocating a wi-
thdrawal agreement to smaller parties which favoured the extremes of  either 
a no-deal Brexit or no Brexit at all. In this sense and respectively, ex UKIP 
leader Nigel Farage’s newly formed Brexit Party came first with 29 seats while 
the Lib Dems also soared from 1 seat in the 2014-2019 EP to 16. Corbyn 
and May, on the other hand, lost half  or more of  their MEPs, winning only 
10 and 4 seats.48 Although the results were not announced until 26 May after 
all EU countries had voted, polling had already revealed that the Tories were 
set for a historic defeat. Thus, after having lost her majority in the snap elec-
tions, having also been defeated three times on the “meaningful vote” on her 
deal and then having enraged Conservative Brexit supporters with an offer 
to Labour MPs of  a vote on whether to hold a second referendum if  her 
Withdrawal Agreement was passed49; on 24 May the Prime Minister officially 
announced her resignation.50 This triggered another contest for a new Con-
servative leader which was won by Boris Johnson. He effectively took over as 
Prime Minister of  the United Kingdom on 24 July 2019.
VI. THE PROROGATION OF PARLIAMENT AND THE CHERRY CASE
The new Prime Minister’s stated mission was to deliver Brexit by the 31 
October extended deadline either through the negotiation of  a new With-
drawal Agreement with the EU that would succeed in Parliament or by lea-
ving without any deal in place. He would not, however, be seeking another 
extension. This was the first promise he would breach. The second was his 
pledge to remove the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland from the With-
48 “European Election 2019: UK results in maps and charts”, 27 May 2019, <https://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48403131> and see also <https://election-results.eu/national-
results/united-kingdom/2019-2024/> (last accessed 18 November 2019). For a comparison 
with the 2014-2019 EP: CraCknell, R., “European Parliament elections: How has the UK 
voted in the past?”, House of  Commons Library (2019). For an analysis of  the 2019 European 
Parliament elections focussing on both the UK and EU-wide results, see: House of  Commons, 
European Parliament Elections 2019: results and analysis, Briefing Paper 8600, 26 June 2019.
49 “Theresa May offers vote on second Brexit referendum”, 21 May 2019, recovered from 
<https://www.ft.com/content/6ef8bcec-7bc4-11e9-81d2-f785092ab560> (last accessed 18 
November 2019).
50 “Theresa May resigns over Brexit: What happened?”, 24 May 2019, recovered from 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48379730> (last accessed 18 November 2019).
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drawal Agreement.51 EU leaders insisted the backstop could not be abolished 
and that they would not be threatened by the prospect of  a no deal scena-
rio.52 This firmness was due to their belief  in the likelihood of  the British 
parliament blocking once again any such hard Brexit.53 Mr Johnson then rose 
severe concerns regarding the Government’s respect for the legislative power 
during such a tumultuous time as the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. At the 
end of  August, he announced the Queen had approved his request to sus-
pend Parliament between 9 and 12 September until 14 October 2019.54 The 
decision was mostly seen as a strategy to avoid proper Parliamentary scrutiny 
of  the Government’s Brexit plans and especially as a way of  strengthening 
its negotiating hand vis-à-vis the EU by giving credibility to the threat of  no-
deal. However, just one day before so-called prorogation was put into effect, 
the Houses of  Parliament managed —in spite of  fierce opposition and very 
little time—,55 to approve the Benn Act. This Act provided a statutory obliga-
tion for the government to prevent a no deal Brexit on 31 October 2019 by 
requiring the Prime Minister to ask for another extension of  Article 50 TEU 
unless the House of  Commons approved a Withdrawal Agreement agreed 
with the European Union by 19 October 2019.56 This effectively rendered 
his prorogation aims futile. Nonetheless, Boris Johnson and his government 
continued to tell EU leaders that the UK would leave with or without a deal 
by legal default of  Article 50 TEU. Indeed, according to Number 10, the Eu-
ropean Union would be making a historic mistake if  it thought the Benn Act 
would stop Brexit from happening on 31 October, as the Government abso-
51 Boris Johnson, “Priorities for Government”, House of  Commons Hansard, 25 July 2019. 
52 “Simon Coveney conveys ‘disappointment’ with Boris Johnson’s four-page letter on Brexit. 
Donald Tusk has re-iterated the EU’s commitment to the backstop”, The Journal.ie, 20 August 2019.
53 “Boris Johnson’s three-way Brexit standoff ”, 29 July 2019, recovered from <https://www.
politico.eu/article/uk-prime-minister-boris-johnson-three-way-brexit-standoff-no-deal-
withdrawal-agreement/> (last accessed 18 November 2019).
54 “Parliament suspension: Queen approves PM’s plan”, 28 August 2019, recovered from 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-49493632>.
55 tolhurst, A., “Tory peers launch bid to block no-deal bill with filibuster in House of  
Lords”, Politics Home, 4th September 2019 [Online].
56 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019, c. 26.
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lutely refused to seek another extension of  negotiations.57 The Benn Act also 
cost the Conservatives its slim majority by one MP defecting58 and another 21 
MPs rebelling and voting with the opposition to stop a no deal Brexit. They 
then had their whip removed and were expelled from the party.59
By this time, the prorogation of  Parliament had also been judicially cha-
llenged and the UK Supreme Court had ruled that the Government’s deci-
sion to prorogue Parliament was unlawful. Indeed, the UKSC again convened 
a panel of  eleven Justices, the maximum number who were permitted to sit 
and, on the 24 September 2019, gave another ruling of  grave constitutional 
importance.60 In the Cherry case, the Court considered that Mr Johnson had 
on many occasions made it clear that he believed that the European Council 
would only agree to changes in the Withdrawal Agreement if  they thought 
that there was a genuine risk that the United Kingdom would leave without 
any such agreement. Yet it was also clear that a majority of  the House of  
Commons would not support withdrawal without an agreement. The Court 
then decided the Prime Minister’s advice to the Crown to prorogue Parlia-
ment for five weeks had the effect of  frustrating the constitutional role of  
Parliament in holding the Government to account and unlawfully prevented 
it from having a voice in the run-up to exit day. It therefore ruled that the 
Parliament’s session had not been brought to an end and if  Parliament so wi-
shed, parliamentary scrutiny of  government activity could continue.61 Parlia-
ment reopened the very next day. Boris Johnson’s deeply worrying response 
57 sChofielD, K., “Boris Johnson warns EU that Benn Act will not stop the UK from leaving 
on 31 October”, Politics Home, 6 October 2019 [Online].
58 “Boris Johnson loses majority as MPs seek to stop no-deal Brexit”, 3 September 2019, 
recovered from <https://www.politico.eu/article/tories-lose-commons-majority-as-phillip-
lee-defects/> (last accessed 18 November 2019).
59 Ten of  the twenty-one subsequently had the whip restored on the 29th October, recovered 
from <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/oct/29/tories-restore-party-whip-to-
10-mps-who-sought-to-block-no-deal-brexit> (last accessed 18 November 2019).
60 Judgment of  24 September 2019, Cherry and others (Respondents) v Advocate General for Scotland 
(Appellant) (Scotland), UKSC 41.
61 elliott, M., “The Supreme Court’s Judgment in Cherry/Miller (No 2)”, Public Law for 
Everyone [Online], (2019).
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was to say that he thought “The Court was wrong to pronounce on what is 
essentially a political question, at a time of  great national controversy.”62
VII. THE “UPDATED” WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT
While the abovementioned constitutional turmoil was going on, talks 
with the EU had reopened and the rough shape of  a new Boris Johnson 
Brexit Deal was emerging.63 On the 17 October it was announced that an 
updated Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration had been agreed. 
This was understood by some as an apparent vindication of  the new UK 
Prime Minister’s strategy to ramp up the threat of  a “no deal” departure and 
force concessions from Brussels.64 However, the “new” Withdrawal Agree-
ment65 remained unchanged in substance as per the agreement reached on 14 
November 2018 except for a revised Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland 
which was basically a return to an even earlier proposal made by the EU in 
February 2017 setting out special arrangements for Northern Ireland.66 This 
proposal had already been rejected by both Theresa May67 and Boris John-
62 See Prime Minister’s Update of  25 September 2019, vol. 664, available here: <https://
hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2019-09-25/debates/AD2A07E5-9741-4EBA-997A-
97776F80AA38/PrimeMinisterSUpdate> (last accessed 18 November 2019). Also, 
konstaDiniDes, t., o’meara, n. & sallustio, r., “The UK Supreme Court’s Judgment 
in Miller/Cherry: Reflections on Its Context and Implications”, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 
October 2019.
63 Grant, C., “Deal Or No Deal? Five Questions on Boris Johnson’s Brexit Talks”, CER 
Insights, 20 September 2019.
64 usherWooD, S., “Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal: what’s in it and how is it different to Theresa 
May’s version?”, UK in a Changing Europe Blog, 17 October 2019.
65 Agreement on the withdrawal of  the United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community [2020] OJ L 29/7.
66 European Commission Draft Withdrawal Agreement on the withdrawal of  the United 
Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community, 28 February 2018, TF50 (2018) 33.
67 ‘No UK PM could ever agree with EU draft’, BBC video of  28 February 2018, available 
at <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-politics-43228485/theresa-may-no-uk-pm-could-
ever-agree-with-eu-draft#> (last accessed 28 March 2020).
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son68 due of  course to its possible impact on the principle of  territorial inte-
grity of  the UK. The significant difference between the deal May secured in 
November and this “new” deal was that her November backstop maintained 
a much more complete and encompassing set of  relations on trade in goods 
between the EU and the UK through an envisaged UK-EU customs territory 
and alignment with EU law and standards, therefore potentially restricting 
the UK’s ability to diverge from EU regulation and pursue an independent 
trade policy. Under the new scenario, only Northern Ireland would remain 
aligned to a limited set of  rules related to the EU’s single market in order 
to avoid a hard border with the Republic of  Ireland and thus the UK could 
have its own trade agreements with other countries. In other words, the EU-
UK single customs territory seeking to avoid both a border on the Island 
but also between Northern Ireland and Britain was replaced with a new way 
to achieve the goal of  avoiding the first border but not the second: in legal 
terms, Northern Ireland will remain part of  the UK customs territory and be 
included in UK free trade agreements. In practice, however, EU customs and 
single market legislation will apply to Northern Ireland, that is, to all goods 
entering its territory if  they risk entering the EU single market. In conclusion, 
there will effectively be a customs and regulatory border between Great Bri-
tain and Northern Ireland down the Irish Sea. Finally, the revised proposal 
is no longer a backstop in case nothing else is agreed and thus subject to EU 
consent for its removal, but a set of  permanent arrangements under a new 
mechanism of  consent which gives the Members of  the Northern Ireland 
Assembly a vote every four years (or every eight years if  continuity of  the 
WA had been endorsed on a cross-community basis).69 If  the Protocol was 
ever rejected by the Assembly, the provisions specific to Northern Ireland 
would cease to apply after two years.70
Regarding the new Political Declaration in which the parties set out their 
vision for the yet to be negotiated future relationship, Theresa May had hoped 
68 ‘Boris Johnson’s letter to Donald Tusk calling for Brexit backstop to be replaced’, Politics 
Home, 19 August 2019.
69 Cross-community voting is a form of  voting used in the Northern Ireland Assembly accor-
ding to the Good Friday Agreement which requires the support of  both main communities 
in Northern Ireland, in other words, a majority of  unionists and a majority of  nationalist 
members of  the Assembly (The Belfast Agreement, 10 April 1998).
70 House of  Commons, The October 2019 EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, Briefing Paper CBP 8713.
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for a much closer future relationship with the EU than Mr Johnson. Hers 
included higher alignment in the regulatory and customs sphere to ensure 
less trade friction and the UK signing up to so-called level playing field pro-
visions. By contrast, Johnson’s Government seeks a Canada-style free trade 
agreement that will not bind the UK to level playing field commitments but 
which envisages zero tariffs and zero quotas.71
Of  course, the first major obstacle for the new PM was the same as for 
the previous one: getting the new deal through the UK Parliament. This 
would have to be done, firstly, without a Conservative majority or the sup-
port of  the DUP72 and, secondly, in time to avoid the Benn Act effect and 
fulfil Johnson’s recurrent promise to leave the EU by October 31. The in-
tention was therefore to present a motion of  approval and have a clean yes 
or no vote on the Withdrawal Agreement on the same day the deadline for 
seeking an extension, i.e. the 19 October, ran out. Thus, the UK Parliament 
sat on a Saturday for the first time in 37 years.73 However, a very important 
and “cunningly crafted” 74 change was again proposed by an MP to the Prime 
Minister’s deal: the Letwin amendment. It passed by 322 votes to 306. The 
idea behind it was that the Government’s motion passing on the 19th would 
have devoid the Benn Act of  effect.  Many MPs feared that in such a case the 
UK could still end up leaving the EU without a deal on 31 October if  the 
extension period ran out before legislation to make Brexit a reality had been 
approved. The Letwin amendment held off  on giving final approval for the 
UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement until after a detailed Bill implementing and 
making other provision in connection with it —the Withdrawal Agreement 
71 European Commission Revised text of  the Political Declaration setting out the framework 
for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom as agreed 
at negotiators’ level on 17 October 2019, to replace the one published in OJ C 66I of  
19.2.2019, TF50 (2019) 65.
72 “Brexit: EU and UK reach deal but DUP refuses support”, 17 October 2019, recovered from 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-50079385> (last accessed 18 November 2019). 
73 This rare Saturday sitting also happened at the outbreak of  World War II, during the 
Suez crisis and during the Falklands conflict, recovered from <https://www.parliament.
uk/business/news/2019/october/parliament-sits-on-a-saturday-to-debate-the-prime-
ministers-proposed-brexit-deal/> (last accessed 18 November 2019).
74 “Brexit delay voted through by MPs: What has just happened?”, 19 October 2019, available at 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-50110214> (last accessed 18 November 2019).
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Bill (WAB)75— was passed. This ultimately meant that the 19 October dead-
line had not been met, the Benn Act was effectively brought into play and the 
Prime Minister was required by law to write to the European Commission 
and request a new extension until January 31. Loud cheers among demonstra-
tors were heard that day outside Westminster where a multitudinous crowd 
had once again gathered after another London march asking for a final ref-
erendum on the withdrawal agreement.76 Late that evening, Mr Johnson sent 
the letter to the EU making clear that he was required by law to seek a delay 
but personally believed that it was a mistake.77 The EU27 accepted the third 
UK request for an extension and the new position under Article 50 was that 
the United Kingdom would leave the Union on 31 January 2020 with or with-
out a Brexit deal.78
VIII. THE WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT BILL (WAB)
Boris Johnson still wished to meet his promised Brexit deadline. His new 
plan was thus to effectively incorporate his Withdrawal Agreement into UK 
law through the Withdrawal Agreement Bill (WAB) and to do so before the 
31 October. The WAB was not only an extremely complex amendment statu-
te of  110 pages overlaid onto The European Union (Withdrawal) Act which gave 
direct effect and supremacy to the WA, but also an enormously important 
piece of  legislation that effectively and finally implemented Brexit. The Go-
vernment nonetheless intended it be given only 3 days of  Parliamentary scru-
tiny: from Monday the 21 October when it was first published until Thursday 
24.  The great stumbling block in this case would therefore be the fast-trac-
king of  the Brexit process because not only the WAB but its timetable had to 
be approved by MPs. The PM, aware that his Bill might gain sufficient votes 
but not be approved in time to fulfil his 31 October promise, used one final 
75 Withdrawal Agreement Bill 58/1.
76 “People’s Vote march: Jubilant scenes at ‘final say’ Brexit protest”, 19 October 2019, recove-
red from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-50108531> (last accessed 18 November 2019). 
77 Prime Minister’s letter to President Donald Tusk 19 October 2019, available here: <https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-president-donald-tusk-19-
october-2019> (last accessed 18 November 2019).
78 European Council Decision taken in agreement with the United Kingdom extending the 
period under Article 50(3) TEU, 28 October 2019, EUCO XT 20024/2/19.
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threat. Unless his 3-day schedule was accepted, he would pull the WAB and 
press for a general election. As anticipated, the first reading in the House of  
Commons on Johnson’s Bill passed by 329 (every Conservative MP, 25 inde-
pendents and 19 Labour) to 299 on Tuesday 22 October but he failed to get 
approval for the timetable by 308 (every Conservative MP, 18 independent 
and 5 Labour) to 322.79 The PM then went on to blame the “dysfunctional” 
Parliament for not reaching his 31 October target and pressed ahead with 
his plan to trigger a snap election. This final plan would take him another 
three thwarted attempts in Parliament because of  the need to secure the su-
pport of  two-thirds of  MPs —434 in total— for a snap election to be appro-
ved through the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011. Finally, true to form, he 
would circumvent this legal requirement by proposing a short, one-off  piece 
of  legislation to trigger an election on 12 December with the advantage of  it 
only requiring a simple majority.80 Lawmakers finally agreed to hold a general 
election on this day and which would notably be unlike any other, not only 
because it was the first UK winter poll since 192381 but because it revolved 
entirely around Brexit.
IX. THE DECEMBER UK ELECTIONS
The December 2019 election was called on the Conservative slogan “Get 
Brexit done” and the Prime Minister’s rhetoric was that parliamentary obs-
tructionism had to be defeated by a new public vote in order to gain a Tory 
majority that would approve his deal. Labour, on the other hand, finally ad-
ded a new referendum to its Brexit policy: if  it won the election it promised 
to renegotiate the Withdrawal Agreement with the EU and put it to another 
79 “Brexit deal: How did my MP vote on the Withdrawal Agreement Bill?”, 22 October 
2019, recovered from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-50145265> (last accessed 
18 November 2019).
80 “Boris Johnson loses election vote — unveils plan B”, 28 October 2019, recovered from 
<https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-mps-reject-snap-election-on-december-12/> (last accessed 
18 November 2019). 
81 “How to Navigate the 2019 General Election: Views from UCL”, 22 November 2019, 
recovered from <https://ucl-brexit.blog/2019/11/22/how-to-navigate-the-2019-general-
election-views-from-ucl/>.
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public vote.82 The Liberal Democrats continued to campaign in favour of  re-
voking the Article 50 TEU notification of  withdrawal with the UK remaining 
a member of  the EU.83 Finally, the SNP supported another referendum on 
EU membership or the revocation of  Article 50 if  either option was the only 
alternative to a no-deal Brexit.84 The general election result was a resounding 
victory for Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Conservatives85 who won 47 new 
MPs with a total of  365 seats and an 80 seat majority.86 This stunning outco-
me immediately led to a generalised acceptance/resignation that Brexit was 
finally set to happen on 31 January 2020.87
X. THE EUROPEAN UNION (WITHDRAWAL) ACT 2020
The UK, in distinction to the monist approach adopted by most other 
countries, is a dualist country where an international treaty is not part of  
British law unless and until there is domestic legislation to give it effect. The 
main purpose of  the new European Union Withdrawal Act (EUWA) intro-
duced to the newly elected House of  Commons on 19 December 2019 is 
to implement the revised EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement in the UK. The 
Government’s sweeping majority effectively changed the political dynamics 
driving the Brexit process and the EUWA passed every legislative stage with 
overwhelming support. Final backing in the House of  Commons was gran-
82 “Labour’s Plan for Brexit”, recovered from <https://labour.org.uk/page/labour-brexit-
plan/> (last accessed 18 November 2019).
83 “2019 Liberal Democrat Manifesto”, recovered from <https://www.libdems.org.uk/
plan> (last accessed 18 November 2019).
84 “General election 2019: SNP’s Brexit position backed by EU vote”, 27 November 2019, 
recovered from <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-scotland-50574653/general-election-
2019-snp-s-brexit-position-backed-by-eu-vote> (last accessed 18 November 2019). 
85 For further analysis of  the British General Election results and what led to them, see: 
Donnelly, B., “Brexit: The End of  the Beginning”, The Federal Trust Blog, 17 December 2019.
86 The results have given rise to serious criticism regarding the first-past-the-post voting sys-
tem used in the UK and its failure to translate public sentiment into reasonably representative 
outcomes: saChs, J., “The UK’s Electoral System Failed”, Project Syndicate, 16 December 2019.
87 orteGa, A., “From Brexit to Great Singapore in Europe”, Elcano Blog, 17 December 
2019; polak, P., “The 2019 UK Elections and the Latest Brexit Deadline”, Yuste Foundation 
Newsletter, vol. 1 (2020). 
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ted on 9 January 2020 with 330 to 231 in favour.88 The House of  Lords 
allowed the Bill to pass on 22 January 2020.89 The next day, it received Royal 
Assent. On the 24 January, Boris Johnson, in representation of  the UK, and 
Ursula von der Leyen and Charles Michel (new Presidents of  the European 
Commission and the European Council, respectively), on behalf  of  the EU, 
signed the Withdrawal Agreement.90 There is no equivalent to the EUWA 
passed by the EU. Following the rules of  Article 50 TEU, the WA, an EU 
Treaty, was approved by the European Parliament on 29 January91 and con-
cluded by the Council of  the EU the day after.92 By effect of  its entry into 
force, the withdrawal process came to an end and the UK became a third 
country on 1 February 2020.
* * * * *
Now the UK is no longer a Member State it can enter into new negotia-
tions with the Union towards establishing their future trade relations that will 
replace its abandoned membership. In the meantime, the UK is existing in a 
transition period during which nearly all EU rules continue to apply, although 
it cannot take part in EU decision-making as it is no longer represented in 
the EU institutions and has lost its voting rights.93 According to Article 126 
of  the Withdrawal Agreement, the transition period will last until the end of  
December 2020 unless extended pursuant to Article 132, that is, by a decision 
88 “Brexit: MPs give final backing to Withdrawal Agreement Bill”, 9 January 2020, recovered 
from <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-51051178> (last accessed 25 March 2020). 
89 “Brexit: EU withdrawal bill clears final parliamentary hurdle”, 22 January 2020, recovered 
from <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-51210602> (last accessed 25 March 2020).
90 european Commission, “The EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement”, recovered from <https://
ec.europa.eu/info/european-union-and-united-kingdom-forging-new-partnership/eu-uk-
withdrawal-agreement_en> (last accessed 25 March 2020).
91 Approval was given following an emotional debate in which MEPs sang “Auld Lang Syne” 
to bid farewell to 40 years of  UK membership: “European Parliament gives final approval to 
Brexit deal, bids farewell with ‘Auld Lang Syne’”, 29 January 2019, recovered from <https://
www.france24.com/en/20200129-european-parliament-gives-final-approval-to-brexit-deal> 
(last accessed 25 March 2020).
92 Council Decision (EU) 2020/135 of  30 January 2020 on the conclusion of  the Agreement 
on the withdrawal of  the United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community.
93 fella, S., “Brexit next steps: The transition period”, House of  Commons Insight (2020).
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adopted before 1 July 2020. Curiously, when the new Conservative Gover-
nment tabled the EUWA, it was a slightly amended version of  the October 
WAB as it no longer found it necessary to include concessions designed to 
gain cross-party support.94 One such amendment was a new clause to rule 
out any extension to the transition period, meaning unless new legislation 
reamends the clause in the near future, the EU and the UK only have eleven 
months to negotiate their new relationship and put an agreement in place.95 
This has been deemed a highly unrealistic timetable given how EU trade 
agreements generally take four to seven years to conclude.96 In effect, all that 
has been discussed thus far regarding the future relationship is contained 
in the revised Political Declaration, a mere non-binding framework to ser-
ve for the forthcoming trade negotiations. According to the PD, the future 
partnership will encompass “a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), as well as wi-
der sectoral cooperation” and will be “underpinned by provisions ensuring a 
level playing field for open and fair competition.”97 The scale of  these gene-
ric commitments of  course depends on the scale of  the future relationship, 
which at the time of  writing remains to be seen.
94 Another clause inserted by Johnson’s Government into the amended withdrawal bill reserved 
the right to lower courts and not only the Supreme Court to reinterpret and overturn EU case 
law (“Brexit: Lower British courts to overrule EU law”, 18 December 2019, recovered from 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/lower-courts-to-overrule-eu-law-rw28swlrg>). 
Likewise, the new EUWA scraps or waters down a number of  key protections compared 
with the October WAB. In this sense, it removes an entire schedule that previously promised 
to protect workers’ rights, with the government suggesting this will now be dealt with in 
separate legislation. Ministers are also no longer bound by the legislation to provide updates 
on the future trading relationship or to make sure the parliament approves the government’s 
negotiating objectives. And thirdly, it waters down a commitment to taking unaccompanied 
refugee children from Europe, known as the Dubs amendment (European Union (Withdrawal 
Agreement) Bill 2019-20).
95 There also exists the possibility of  amending the WA and eliminating the need to agree 
on an extension by the 1 July 2020 as pointed out by loCke, T., “In the twilight zone: the 
transition period in the Withdrawal Agreement”, in Santos Vara, J., Wessel, R. & Polak, P. 
(eds), Research Handbook on the International Dimension of  Brexit (forthcoming Routledge 2020). 
96 “EU brushes off  Boris Johnson’s deadline for post-Brexit trade deal”, 17 December 2019, 
recovered from <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/election-2019-boris-johnson-takes-
tough-new-line-on-brexit-trade-talks-03blg97jz?region=global> (last accessed 25 March 2020).
97 Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the 
European Union and the United Kingdom, OJ [2020] C34/12.
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Experience has shown that it took the UK three and a half  agonising 
years of  uncertainty since the Brexit referendum to negotiate just three basic 
pillars for its divorce: citizens’ rights, a financial settlement and the issue of  
the Irish border. The main difficulty was the hung Parliament that resulted 
from Theresa May’s snap election in June 2017, leaving her with a minority 
Government that never offered the simple majority needed in the House of  
Commons to approve her deal with Brussels. There was no such problem in 
the EU. The European institutions had tactically ensured a united front by 
limiting the divorce negotiations to matters in which it was easy for the EU27 
to have perfectly aligned interests. All of  them of  course wanted the UK to 
pay the Brexit bill, to retain rights for their citizens living in the UK and to let 
Ireland shape the negotiations over the Irish border.98 On the contrary, they 
could have different interests over international trade, finance and migration, 
issues that were deliberately left for the future but now have to be faced.99 
Thus, the tables might have turned. Whereas the Johnson Government has 
a thumping majority to quickly approve his future agreement at home, rati-
fication by the EU could prove cumbersome. Especially if  its content goes 
beyond EU exclusive competences and becomes a mixed treaty, i.e. one re-
quiring Member State ratification by national —and in some cases regional— 
parliaments. Furthermore, whereas the European Commission strategically 
exploited its united position to gain leverage in the withdrawal negotiations 
and extract concessions from the UK,100 the latter might suddenly find it can 
now capitalise on divergent national interests in the EU during these more 
sensitive trade talks. As with everything Brexit, only time will tell.
98 sprinGforD, J., loWe, s. & oppenheim, b., “Will the unity of  the 27 crack?” Centre for Eu-
ropean Reform Policy Brief (2018). 
99 In effect, Article 50 does not include a selection of  material issues that must be agreed in 
a withdrawal agreement but refers merely to “the arrangements for withdrawal” which the 
European institutions have freely interpreted.
100 patel, O., “The EU and the Brexit Negotiations: Institutions, Strategies and Objectives” 
UCL Brexit Insight (2018).
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